September 13, 2017

Why we need a paper trail for our ballots

Washington Times - The country’s voting machines are susceptible to hacking, which could be done in a way so that it leaves no fingerprints, making it impossible to know whether the outcome was changed, computer experts told President Trump’s voter integrity commission.

“There’s no perfect security; there’s only degrees of insecurity,” said Ronald Rivest, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

He said hackers have myriad ways of attacking voting machines. “You don’t want to rest the election of the president on, ‘Maybe the Wi-Fi was turned on when it shouldn’t have been.’”

He and two other computer security experts said bar codes on ballots and smartphones in voting locations could give hackers a chance to rewrite results in ways that couldn’t be traceable, short of sampling of ballots or hand recounts — and those work only in cases where there’s a paper trail.

Andrew Appel, a professor at Princeton University, said it would be easy to write a program that cheats on election results and deletes evidence of the hack as soon as the results are reported.

4 comments:

Tom Puckett said...

Casino slots give you a receipt - we should at least be able to match their security! Cheers, Tom

Anonymous said...

To positively foil tampering with electronic voting machines it will be necessary to trash them, and return to hand counted paper ballots.

But that's a lot of work and it will take forever the electronic geeks and vote thieves will tell us, to which we should answer 'so what?'.

No one ever died from counting ballots by hand, or from waiting for days for the verified election results.

The only valid argument for electronic voting machines is that it makes it very easy to manipulate and falsify the vote.

Anonymous said...

Ballot boxes used to routinely be stuffed with fraudulent paper ballots. Paper ballots are not a solution.

A solution IS possible with a 4-step process:

1) Voter enters polling place, qualifies to vote, receives anonymous ticket created with a cryptographically unique, unbreakable tag issued on a per-election basis.

2) At the next station, voter anonymously exchanges ticket for ballot. Voter fills up and submits ballot at a third station, receiving receipt with ticket and ballot number on, as well as a record of how her/his vote was recorded. If the receipt doesn't match the voter's intentions, the voter disclaims the recorded vote, the ballot is voided and the voter votes again, feeding the new ballot into a different machine. Rinse and repeat if need be.

3) After votes tallied, all votes are published, keyed to the respective anonymous tickets, ballots, and receipts. The names and addresses of all voters are also published, so that obvious problems such as more ballots than voters can easily be caught.

4) Voter verifies or impeaches the accuracy of the record as tallied. If verfied, the person's choices are added to the official total. If too few verifications, the election is declared void and re-run.

Anonymous said...

6:39

Step 3 would be such a gift to stalkers, abusive ex's who would like to find their former victims, and any bully looking for former targets to harm again. It would cause all sorts of people to not vote for fear of losing privacy. Don't publish people's names AND addresses, it endangers people.